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Nondelegation and the Major Questions 
Doctrine: Displacing Interpretive Power 
MARLA D. TORTORICE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1984, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. has held a prominent place in 
administrative law.1 This “quasi-constitutional text”2 
provides the foundation for reasonable agency deference in 
the face of statutory ambiguity. While Chevron remains the 
law today, and this deference to executive agencies remains 
theoretically intact, the landscape of administrative law has 
changed since 1984. Over time, both scholars and judges 
have raised serious doubts about the rationale behind 
Chevron and its consequences. One well-known critic, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, has gone as far as to accuse Chevron of being 
an “abdication of the judicial duty”3 and question whether 
 
†Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Michael Fisher, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, 2019–20; Associate Attorney, Reed Smith, LLP, 2017–19; J.D., 
2017, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law; B.A., 2014, summa cum laude, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful to 
George Taylor for invaluable comments and suggestions. 
 1. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1867, 1872 (2015) (noting that Chevron is “the Supreme Court’s most 
important decision regarding judicial deference to agency views of statutory 
meaning”). 
 2. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). 
 3. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) 
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the time has come to reconsider it altogether. 
This Article takes a particular look at Justice Gorsuch’s 
constitutional critique of the current administrative state, 
which arguably is being manifested most predominantly as 
the major questions doctrine in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Justice Gorsuch, among others, argues that 
the current administrative state—specifically post-
Chevron—violates the separation of powers as the Framers 
intended. Under his view, the Constitution vests the 
legislature with the power to make the law, but, under 
Chevron, Congress is unconstitutionally delegating too much 
of that power to the executive in the form of regulatory 
agencies. 
While this “nondelegation” argument is one legitimate, 
constitutional argument, there also exists an opposing 
constitutional argument in defense of Chevron. The opposing 
argument, which is also grounded in the separation of 
powers, embodies the “intelligible principle” doctrine, which 
states that if Congress delegates quasi-legislative powers to 
another body, it must provide a “general provision” by which 
“those who . . . act” can “fill up the details.”4 In other words, 
Congress cannot give an agency unlimited freedom to craft 
laws, but it can authorize the agency to clarify the meaning 
of a law that Congress has already enacted. 
Thus, because two equivalent constitutional 
interpretations of Chevron exist, this Article claims that 
resolution of this interpretive dispute does not rest on some 
neutral place of constitutional bedrock, but instead proceeds 
on the basis of the proper role of the current administrative 
state. Justice Gorsuch is not engaging simply in a formalistic 
interpretation of the Constitution in advocating for the 
overturn of Chevron. His argument has its own policy 
orientation and goals—it serves to reject the growth of the 
administrative state. 
 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 4. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825). 
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The principal way that the nondelegation argument is 
currently manifesting in Supreme Court jurisprudence is 
through the major questions doctrine. The major questions 
doctrine arises when the Court rejects Chevron deference by 
arguing that Congress would not have delegated a question 
of this significance to the agency. But under both 
nondelegation and the major questions doctrine, the Court 
claims to restrict the power of an administrative agency and 
relocate lawmaking power, as required under separation of 
powers, to the legislative branch. This Article demonstrates, 
though, that by invoking the major questions doctrine, the 
Court is, in fact, enhancing its own interpretive power. 
The purpose of this Article is twofold: (1) to demonstrate 
that because a dispute in the constitutional interpretation of 
Chevron exists over the proper separation of powers, it is 
insufficient for Justice Gorsuch to claim to rely solely on a 
nondelegation argument to refute Chevron deference and (2) 
to demonstrate that the major questions doctrine acts more 
as a facade for the Court’s separation of power effort to 
diminish administrative power. Neither of these critiques of 
Chevron actually fixes the alleged problem of 
unconstitutional delegations because their “remedy” is for 
the Court to be the body that assumes interpretive authority. 
But, under this remedy, the separation of powers is not being 
restored to what the Constitution intended; the delegation is 
not being restored to the legislature. Thus, the argument is 
really about a policy disagreement over the role of the 
administrative state, which remains in dispute. While other 
scholarly articles note that the enhancement of the Court’s 
own interpretive powers is one of the major questions 
doctrine’s ramifications,5 this Article is distinct in the depth 
 
 5. See, e.g., Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On 
the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 
2019, 2050 (2018) (“The major questions cases are therefore best understood as a 
way to reassert the primacy of courts over agencies as the interpretive agents of 
Congress.”); Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 
1937 (2017) (questioning whether the major questions doctrine was intended to 
serve as a “power canon” for the Court to “seiz[e] power aligned with its basic 
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in which it addresses this issue and in its argument against 
nondelegation as both a critique of Chevron and a rationale 
of the major questions doctrine.6 
Part I of this Article will provide background on Chevron, 
its rationales, and the competing separation of powers 
arguments both in favor of and against Chevron deference. 
Part II will summarize Justice Gorsuch’s argument against 
Chevron—found mainly in his Tenth Circuit Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch concurrence, which, while not mentioning 
the major questions doctrine by name, can be interpreted as 
fuel for its revitalization. Part II will also outline the 
emergence of the major questions doctrine in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, arguing that this doctrine is a manifestation 
of the nondelegation argument and criticism of Chevron 
generally. Lastly, Part III of this Article illustrates the pitfall 
of Justice Gorsuch’s nondelegation argument: that by 
stopping the delegation (whether improper or not), the Court 
is in fact rerouting the delegation to itself, which results in 
the Court doing the work of the legislator by deciding 
legislative meaning as it deems proper. Part III also argues 
that the major questions doctrine acts as a facade for the 
Court’s nondelegation effort to diminish administrative 
power, by adopting the same remedy as Justice Gorsuch’s 
 
distrust of an active administrative state”); Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions 
About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 499 
(2016) (stating in the conclusion that, “when the Court applies the doctrine, it 
diminishes the deference that an agency normally receives, thereby shifting 
interpretive authority to the courts”); Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2191, 2202 (2016) (“[T]he [major questions] exception has sought to route 
especially ‘big’ or consequential questions away from agencies and to 
courts . . . .”). 
 6. But see Emerson, supra note 5, at 2044–45 (“Since the primary purpose of 
the major questions doctrine is to reinforce the nondelegation doctrine [via the 
Court’s use of substantive canons], the justification for the major questions 
doctrine must be sought out in the nondelegation doctrine itself.”); Jacob Loshin 
& Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 52–
53 (2010) (same); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of 
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 242 (2000) (offering the under-enforced 
constitutional principle of nondelegation as a rationale for the major questions 
doctrine). 
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argument. Therefore, what underlies these nondelegation 
arguments is a policy effort to reduce the status of the 
current administrative state. 
I. CHEVRON BACKGROUND 
A. The Supreme Court Case: Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has been 
termed a “counter-Marbury for the administrative state,” 
which stated that “in the face of ambiguity, it is emphatically 
the province and duty of the administrative department to 
say what the law is.”7 Chevron did this by creating a two-step 
inquiry for courts to follow in reviewing agency 
interpretations of law.8 Under Step One, the Court asks 
whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”9 If it has, and Congress’s intent is 
consequently clear, then this ends the Court’s inquiry as the 
Court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”10 The Court proceeds to Step Two only if 
it determines that Congress has not directly addressed the 
question at issue—meaning the statute is silent—or if the 
statute is ambiguous with regard to the specific issue.11 
Under Step Two, rather than imposing its own construction 
of the statute— as the Court would normally do in the 
absence of administrative interpretation—the Court asks 
whether the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible” or 
reasonable construction of the statute.12 If the agency’s 
 
 7. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasis original). 
 8. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984). 
 9. Id. at 842. 
 10. Id. at 843. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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interpretation is reasonable, then the agency’s 
interpretation is controlling.13 Note that “reasonable” does 
not mean whether, in the Court’s view, the interpretation is 
how the Court would have answered the question had it been 
given the task, but rather whether the agency’s 
interpretation is a permissible reading of the statute, 
regardless of whether the Court agrees with it.14 
While Chevron framed the deference inquiry in two 
steps, a third step—Step Zero—was subsequently developed 
that asks whether Chevron’s two-step framework should 
apply to begin with. According to Cass Sunstein, this step 
was developed through a trilogy of cases,15 suggesting that 
“when agencies have not exercised delegated power to act 
with the force of law, a case-by-case analysis of several 
factors ought to be used to determine whether Chevron 
provides the governing framework.”16 Chevron Step Zero is 
also commonly derived from United States v. Mead 
Corporation, which held that Chevron only applies if 
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency with 
respect to the provision in question and the agency has made 
an appropriate formal ruling.17 In short, Step Zero reasons 
that if Chevron is based on a theory of implied delegation, 
then it is reasonable to assume that there are some questions 
of interpretation that Congress would not have wanted to 
delegate to the agencies. 
B. The Rationales Behind the Case 
In promulgating Chevron’s two-step test, the Court did 
 
 13. Id. at 844. 
 14. Id. at 843 n.11. 
 15. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 16. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 193. Step Zero is more complex than this, but 
for the purposes of this Article, the above explanation suffices. See id. at 211–31 
for a discussion on the cases that provide the foundation for Chevron Step Zero 
and the resulting applicability of the Chevron framework. 
 17. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
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not provide a clear rationale behind its approach. One of the 
reasons the Court gave for why agencies should be permitted 
to interpret statutory ambiguities, with reasonableness as 
their only limitation, was implied delegation: 
The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the 
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a 
gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority 
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on 
a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, 
a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator 
of an agency.18 
However, this justification does not explain why a court 
should find an implicit delegation to the agency, either on the 
basis of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or the 
Clear Air Act, which provided the governing statutory 
provisions in Chevron.19 The APA, on the contrary, states 
that the “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions 
of law, [and] interpret . . . statutory provisions,”20 suggesting 
that ambiguities must be resolved by the court. This has led 
many Supreme Court Justices and scholars to draw the 
conclusion that implied delegation is merely a legal fiction.21 
 
 18. Chevron, 467 U.S at 843–44 (citations omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 
415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
 19. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 196. 
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 21. See e.g., Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole 
Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 91 
(2000) (“Insofar as Chevron instructs lower courts to treat a statutory ambiguity 
as an implicit delegation of interpretive authority, it is widely understood to rest 
on a fiction.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 224 (citing Breyer’s observation on the fiction 
of Chevron); Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal 
Fictions After King v. Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 719 (2017) (“The Chevron 
opinion, however, rests on the legal fiction that Congress, by leaving a gap or 
ambiguity in a statute, evinces an intent to delegate to the administering agency 
the power to fill in that gap.”); Herz, supra note 1, at 1876 (“But it is hard to find 
anyone who does not consider congressional delegation a fiction.”); John F. 
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Indeed, both Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin 
Scalia wrote separate law review articles in the 1980s 
discussing this implication of delegation as an important 
legal fiction newly created by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron.22 
The Court in Chevron also provided two additional policy 
reasons to justify deference: agency expertise and political 
accountability. The Court noted that “[j]udges are not 
experts in the field”23 and “[w]hile agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of 
the statute in light of everyday realities.”24 
The debate about how to understand Chevron’s rationale 
continues to this day, with scholars both returning to the 
original justifications such as implied delegation, agency 
expertise, and political accountability, and also appraising 
new ones like uniformity.25 Jonathan Adler makes a 
 
Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1932 (2015) (“Yet 
whatever the background legislative understanding about deference and 
delegation may once have been, it would be facetious for judges today to treat the 
availability of deference as a question of genuine legislative intent.”). 
 22. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986). See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517. 
 23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 24. Id. at 865–66. 
 25. See Jonathan Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 
987–89 (2016) (“Empowering agencies to offer authoritative interpretations of 
ambiguous federal laws also serves the goal of uniformity within the federal 
system. If federal law is federal law, it should apply uniformly throughout the 
nation. Leaving the interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutes to the courts 
can result in different interpretations applying in different places (at least until 
the Supreme Court resolves such questions, should it choose to do so). A federal 
agency interpretation to which courts are obliged to defer, on the other hand, 
provides for a single nationwide interpretation of the relevant statute.”). 
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distinction between these types of rationales. He points out 
that agency expertise, political accountability, and 
uniformity are all policy reasons for deferring to agencies 
over judges.26 But Chevron needed a legal basis as well, 
especially when one considers the fact that the 
Administrative Procedure Act essentially states the opposite 
rule: that it is courts that are to “decide all relevant questions 
of law,” which includes the meaning of “statutory 
provisions.”27 Despite the lack of a statutory provision that 
instructs the courts to defer to agency interpretations in 
cases of ambiguous statutory texts, the Supreme Court, on 
numerous occasions, has noted that Chevron is premised on 
a delegation of interpretive power from Congress to executive 
agencies.28 This is what is meant by implied delegation. 
Implied delegation is, in fact, rooted in the Constitution. 
It is a function of the exclusive allocation of legislative 
authority to Congress in Article I.29 However, because few 
statutes explicitly provide for this delegation, the rationale 
that Congress intends each ambiguity as a delegation of 
authority is considered by most to be a “legal fiction.”30 But 
if it is a legal fiction, it is a widely accepted one, and one that 
 
 26. Id. at 989. 
 27. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 28. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (Chevron “is premised on 
the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”); FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (same); United States v. 
Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 229 (2001) (recognizing that the delegation of 
authority may be implicit); see also Adler, supra note 25, at 990–91. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”). 
 30. Adler, supra note 25, at 990–91; see also Lisa Schulz Bressman, 
Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 
2009 (2011) (noting Chevron “rests on a legal fiction”); Herz, supra note 1, at 1876 
(“[I]t is hard to find anyone who does not consider congressional delegation a 
fiction.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, 
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 
749 (2002) (“Chevron deference revolves around the fiction of a congressional 
delegation . . . .”). 
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provides the basis for Chevron’s legal foundation. As Justice 
Scalia remarked in a 1989 article: 
Chevron . . . replaced [a] statute-by-statute evaluation . . . with an 
across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency 
discretion is meant . . . . Surely, [this] is a more rational 
presumption today than it would have been thirty years ago—which 
explains the change in the law. Broad delegation to the Executive 
is the hallmark of the modern administrative state; agency 
rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they once were, the 
exception; and as the sheer number of modern departments and 
agencies suggests, we are awash in agency “expertise.” . . . In the 
vast majority of cases I expect that Congress . . . didn’t think about 
the matter at all . . . [which means] any rule adopted in this field 
represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates 
principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can 
legislate.31 
C. The Competing Constitutional Interpretations of Chevron 
There exist two competing constitutional interpretations 
of Chevron. Both concern the proper separation of powers 
and arise out of the historical development of the 
nondelegation doctrine. What this Article terms the 
“nondelegation argument” more closely aligns with the 
traditional nondelegation doctrine, which represents the 
reluctance in the 1930s to expand the powers of the federal 
government. Advocates for a reduction of Chevron deference 
and the administrative state in general use this 
nondelegation argument. On the contrary, those who 
advocate for maintaining the current administrative state 
use the “intelligible principle argument,” which represents a 
willingness after the 1930s to accommodate legislative 
delegations given the increasing difficulties of governing a 
 
 31. Scalia, supra note 22, at 516–17. Justice Scalia goes on to state that “[i]f 
that is the principal function to be served, Chevron is unquestionably better than 
what preceded it” because (1) “Congress now knows that the ambiguity it 
creates . . . will be resolved within the bounds of permissible interpretation . . . by 
a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known”; and (2) 
Chevron “permit[s] needed flexibility, and appropriate political participation, in 
the administrative process.” Id. at 517. 
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growing nation.32 This gave way to a modification of the 
traditional nondelegation doctrine, equating 
constitutionality with the presence of an “intelligible 
principle” from Congress. 
Those favoring a reduction in the current administrative 
state use the nondelegation argument. The traditional 
nondelegation doctrine states: “That Congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle 
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the 
Constitution.”33 This is because Article I of the Constitution 
vests all legislative power in Congress. According to the 
nondelegation argument’s advocates, Justice Gorsuch among 
them, the nondelegation doctrine has an essential connection 
to separation of powers and individual liberty.34 This position 
emphasizes more the “separation” in the separation of 
powers. It is a more literal understanding of the structure of 
the Constitution and of the APA (which requires that courts 
“decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions”),35 as well as 
Marbury v. Madison’s enunciation of judicial duty.36 
 
 32. For a discussion on the judicial history of the nondelegation doctrine, see 
Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The 
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 921, 928–933 (2006). 
 33. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“Congress generally cannot delegate its 
legislative power to another [b]ranch.”). 
 34. DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237, 1241 (2015) (“The 
principle that Congress cannot delegate away its vested powers exists to protect 
liberty.”) (Alito, J., concurring) (“At issue in this case is the proper division 
between legislative and executive powers. An examination of the history of those 
powers reveals how far our modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence has 
departed from the original meaning of the Constitution.”) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (outlining the standards by which a court should 
determine the validity of an agency action in reviewing its proceedings). 
 36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
1086 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
As applied here, the nondelegation argument is that 
Congress’s delegation of authority to executive agencies 
under Chevron is unconstitutional because Congress is 
delegating too much of its constitutional power to the 
executive. The major questions doctrine, then, is one way for 
the Court to remedy these unconstitutional delegations, as it 
stops them in cases of significant questions. 
On the other hand, those in favor of maintaining the 
current administrative state use the intelligible principle 
argument: that as long as Congress has supplied something 
like an “intelligible principle” to guide and limit executive 
discretion, delegations of power are constitutional.37 
Notably, what is considered a permissible intelligible 
principle can be very broad and vague. For example, in 
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., the Court 
held that the language “requisite to protect the public 
health” contained a sufficient intelligible principle to guide 
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in setting air 
quality standards.38 This finding follows a long line of 
precedent in which broad and vague terms are still held as 
containing an intelligible principle.39 
So while the nondelegation argument emphasizes more 
the separation in the separation of powers, the intelligible 
 
 37. The intelligible principle doctrine can be originally attributed to J. W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, a 1928 case, where the Court upheld 
Congress’s delegation to the President to set tariff rates that would equalize 
production costs in the United States and competing countries. See J. W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). There, the Court 
emphasized the importance of seeking the cooperation of another branch of 
government, and in doing so, Congress was only restrained by the “common sense 
and the inherent necessities” of the situation. Id. at 406. The Court stated it 
would uphold delegations as long as Congress provided an “intelligible principle” 
to which the President or an agency must comply. Id. at 409 (“If Congress shall 
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). 
 38. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001). 
 39. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 
607, 612 (1980); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
2019] DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER 1087 
principle argument emphasizes instead the principle that 
the separation of powers also works to permit coordination of 
powers, in order to allow government to function effectively. 
For instance, Buckley v. Valeo embodies this principle when 
it cites prior precedent on the subject of the three branches 
of government as “co-ordinate parts of one government,” 
stating that one branch may seek assistance from another 
“according to common sense and the inherent necessities of 
the government co-ordination.”40 The separation of powers 
contemplates “that practice will integrate the dispersed 
powers into a workable government.”41 Chief Justice Roberts 
also emphasizes this principle in Burwell by discussing the 
Court’s role in ensuring government workability rather than 
insisting on more literal understandings that defeat the 
government design.42 Those in favor of the intelligible 
principle argument would argue that the nondelegation 
argument, and its literal interpretation of the separation of 
powers, makes government unworkable, but making 
government unworkable is precisely its goal. 
Thus, the intelligible principle argument, in contrast to 
the nondelegation argument, is grounded more in something 
akin to constitutional realism rather than legal formalism, 
 
 40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (quoting Hampton & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). 
 41. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 
(1952)). 
 42. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by 
the people. Our role is more confined—“to say what the law is.” Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). That is 
easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect 
the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. 
A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the 
legislative plan. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve 
health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must 
interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids 
the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what we see as 
Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we adopt. 
Id. (Roberts, J., writing for the majority). 
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recognizing the realities of the traditional nondelegation 
doctrine. Even though scholars and judges continue to use 
the nondelegation argument to make a case against Chevron, 
there have only been two decisions invalidating an agency 
action as unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds.43 Both 
decisions were in 1935, one of which “provided literally no 
guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which 
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the 
basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the 
economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’”44 Many scholars 
attribute the reason for the lack of the nondelegation 
doctrine’s enforcement, despite the many opportunities for 
the Court to do so, to its impossibility of being judicially 
administered in a principled way.45 Justice Scalia stated in 
Whitman that “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-
guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the 
law.’”46 
As Professor John Manning has summarized: 
“[E]nforcement of the nondelegation doctrine necessarily 
reduces to the question whether a statute confers too much 
discretion. Without a reliable metric (other than an I-know-
it-when-I-see-it test), the Court has long doubted its capacity 
to make principled judgments about such questions of 
 
 43. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 44. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing 
Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 388; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 
at 495). 
 45. See e.g., Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 321 
(2000) (“[J]udicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would raise serious 
problems of judicial competence and would greatly magnify the role of the 
judiciary in overseeing the operation of modern government. Because the 
relevant questions are ones of degree, the nondelegation doctrine could not be 
administered in anything like a rule-bound way, and hence the nondelegation 
doctrine is likely, in practice, to violate its own aspirations to discretion-free 
law.”); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 6, at 57. 
 46. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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degree.”47 The traditional nondelegation doctrine largely 
failed as a constitutional matter. Nonetheless, the 
nondelegation argument appears to have been resurrected as 
a doctrine of statutory interpretation. 
This Article will primarily focus on the nondelegation 
argument because this is the argument used by critics of 
Chevron, particularly Justice Gorsuch. The nondelegation 
argument often provides the justification that Justice 
Gorsuch and proponents of the major questions doctrine use 
to argue that Chevron deference should be scaled back. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to appreciate that both the 
nondelegation argument and the intelligible principle are 
viable separation of powers arguments that concern the 
proper constitutional interpretation of Chevron. Deciding 
which of these constitutional visions one aligns with usually 
depends upon one’s policy preference on the status of the 
current administrative state. 
II. CHEVRON CRITICISM 
Chevron has drawn much criticism. Many judges and 
scholars reject the intelligible principle argument and the 
“legal fiction” of implied delegation. They believe that an 
ambiguity in a statute does not reflect a congressional intent 
for agencies to fill in the gaps,48 and such delegations are a 
violation of the separation of powers. Indeed, under these 
views, it is the Court’s function to resolve legislative 
meanings. This Part focuses on Justice Gorsuch’s 
nondelegation argument against Chevron deference and the 
major questions doctrine as a manifestation of that criticism 
against Chevron. 
A. Justice Gorsuch’s Argument 
One of the more well-known critics of the Chevron 
 
 47. Manning, supra note 6, at 241–42. 
 48. See Garry, supra note 32, at 945–46. 
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doctrine is now-Justice Gorsuch. As previously mentioned, 
one of his main arguments is that Chevron is contrary to the 
separation of powers as the Framers intended. He penned 
this critique when he was still sitting on the Tenth Circuit in 
an opinion titled Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.49 The majority 
opinion, which he also wrote, is important as it addresses the 
interplay between judicial and agency interpretations under 
both Chevron and Brand X.50 However, Justice Gorsuch’s 
separate concurrence is even more vital for the purposes of 
this Article because it is there that Justice Gorsuch focuses 
on the nondelegation argument, all but calling for the 
Supreme Court to overturn Chevron. 
1. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch Majority Opinion 
The intricate question before the Tenth Circuit in 
Gutierrez-Brizuela was: “[A]ccepting that an agency may 
overrule a court, may it do so not only prospectively but also 
retroactively, applying its new rule to completed conduct 
that transpired at a time when the contrary judicial 
precedent appeared to control?”51 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Gorsuch held that an agency’s interpretation is not 
“legally effective” until a court, in deference to the agency, 
overrules itself.52 
Gutierrez-Brizuela dealt with two seemingly 
contradictory provisions of U.S. immigration law. The first 
statute “grants the Attorney General discretion to ‘adjust the 
status’ of those who have entered the country illegally and 
afford them lawful residency.”53 The second statute “provides 
that certain persons who have entered this country illegally 
 
 49. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 50. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005). 
 51. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1143. 
 52. Id. at 1145. 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2) (2012); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing 
De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
2019] DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER 1091 
more than once are categorically prohibited from winning 
lawful residency . . . unless they first serve a ten-year 
waiting period outside our borders.”54 In 2005, the Tenth 
Circuit determined that the first statute should control.55 
Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-Caldera I) held that 
the Attorney General’s discretion to afford relief without 
insisting on a decade-long waiting period remained intact.56 
However, in 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) issued In re Briones.57 In Briones, the BIA decided 
that as a matter of policy discretion the statutory tension 
should be resolved against affording the Attorney General 
any discretion to consider applications for adjustment of 
status when the second statute applies.58 The BIA sought to 
apply this new rule—holding that the second statute 
controls—in Padilla-Caldera II.59 There, the Tenth Circuit 
held that “the Supreme Court’s extension of Chevron in 
Brand X further required this court to defer to the agency’s 
policy choice and overrule our own governing statutory 
interpretation in Padilla-Caldera I.”60 
Unfortunately, that was not the end of the court’s 
recitation of relevant procedural history. The BIA tried to 
make its In re Briones ruling retroactive in a case titled De 
 
 54. 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing 
De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167)). 
 55. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales 
(Padilla-Caldera I), 426 F.3d 1294, 1299–1301 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and 
superseded on reh’g by 453 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (citing In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007)). 
 58. Id. (citing In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (Padilla-Caldera II), 637 F.3d 1140, 
1148–52 (10th Cir. 2011)). The Tenth Circuit engaged in a Chevron analysis, 
finding that the “two statutory directives were ambiguous [and] that ‘step two’ of 
Chevron required this court to assume that Congress had delegated legislative 
authority to the BIA to make a ‘reasonable’ policy choice in the face of this 
statutory ambiguity.” Id. (citing Padilla–Caldera II, 637 F.3d at 1148–52). 
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Niz Robles,61 and the Tenth Circuit quite simply said “no.” 
Both bodies agreed that after Padilla-Caldera II all future 
petitioners must satisfy the ten-year waiting period and not 
seek discretionary relief from the Attorney General.62 But De 
Niz Robles applied to a petitioner who applied for 
discretionary relief in express reliance on Padilla-Caldera I, 
before the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation 
in Briones.63 The Tenth Circuit held that “because the 
agency’s promulgation of a new rule of general applicability 
under Chevron step two and Brand X is an exercise of 
delegated legislative policymaking authority, it is subject to 
the presumption of prospectivity that attends true exercises 
of legislative authority.”64 
Finally arriving to the case before it in 2016—Gutierrez-
Brizuela—the BIA tried again to bring a similar claim. Mr. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, like Mr. De Niz Robles, applied for 
adjustment of status in reliance on the court’s decision in 
Padilla-Caldera I.65 The difference is that Mr. Gutierrez-
Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s 
announcement of its contrary interpretation in Briones but 
before Padilla-Caldera II declared Briones controlling and 
Padilla-Caldera I overruled.66 The BIA argued that this 
distinction made “all the legal difference.”67 But the Tenth 
Circuit disagreed.68 
Justice Gorsuch wrote that Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela was 
eligible for adjusted status because Padilla-Caldera I—and 
not Briones or Padilla-Caldera II—controlled his 2009 
 
 61. De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 62. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (citing De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1172–74). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1144–45. 
 67. Id. at 1145. 
 68. Id. 
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application for adjusted status.69 This was because of both 
the rule and the reasoning in De Niz Robles v. Lynch.70 
The court first discussed the rule in De Niz Robles, which 
was: “An agency in the Chevron step two/Brand X scenario 
may enforce its new policy judgment only with judicial 
approval.”71 The BIA depended on Padilla-Caldera II (a 
Tenth Circuit Court opinion) to render Briones (a BIA 
opinion) effective. Why? Because the court had to “discharge 
its obligation under Chevron step two and Brand X to 
determine that the statutory provisions at issue were indeed 
ambiguous [and] that the BIA’s interpretation of them was 
indeed reasonable.”72 
Then, the court turned to De Niz Robles’ reasoning: “[T]o 
the extent the executive is permitted to exercise delegated 
legislative authority to overrule judicial decisions, logic 
suggests it should be bound by the same presumption of 
prospectivity that attends true legislative enactments.”73 If 
Congress, for example, wanted to amend the law to dismiss 
a judicial decision such as Padilla-Caldera I, its actions 
would have controlled conduct arising only after the 
legislation went into effect. In this case, we know that 
Briones only went into effect when the Tenth Circuit handed 
down Padilla-Caldera II.74 Thus, individuals were free to 
rely on Padilla-Caldera I.75 
In sum, focusing on a court’s obligation to find whether 
the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and, if it is, 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, Guiterrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch held that an agency’s interpretation must 
 
 69. Id. at 1144–45. 
 70. Id. at 1145; De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 71. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1145 (quoting De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 
1174). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (citing De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1172). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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wait for a court’s approval. In other words, an agency’s 
interpretation is not “legally effective” until a court, in 
deference to the agency, overrules itself. 
2. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch Concurrence 
Clearly believing that Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch 
demonstrated fundamental problems with the Chevron 
doctrine, Justice Gorsuch took the opportunity to write a 
separate concurring opinion. His opening remarks set the 
overall tone of the concurrence: “[T]he fact is Chevron and 
Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge 
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and 
concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a 
little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ 
design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”76 
For the purposes of this Article, I will break down Justice 
Gorsuch’s relevant concerns regarding Chevron into two 
categories, both of which relate to the separation of powers. 
Justice Gorsuch argues that Chevron and Brand X are 
contrary to the separation of powers intended by the framers 
of the Constitution both by (1) depriving the judiciary of its 
proper role (the “abdication of judicial duty argument”) and 
(2) relinquishing excessive legislative authority to the 
executive (the “nondelegation argument”).77 It is the second 
 
 76. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 1154 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch has a third, related 
argument that Chevron makes it considerably more difficult for “the people” to 
discern what the law is: 
Under Chevron the people aren’t just charged with awareness of and the 
duty to conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a 
detached magistrate can muster. Instead, they are charged with an 
awareness of Chevron; required to guess whether the statute will be 
declared “ambiguous” (courts often disagree on what qualifies); and 
required to guess (again) whether an agency’s interpretation will be 
deemed “reasonable.” Who can even attempt all that, at least without an 
army of perfumed lawyers and lobbyists? And, of course, that’s not the 
end of it. Even if the people somehow manage to make it through this 
far unscathed, they must always remain alert to the possibility that the 
agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime based merely 
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argument that is the focus of this Article. 
First, as to the abdication of judicial duty argument, 
Justice Gorsuch states that Chevron and Brand X prevent 
courts from fulfilling their constitutional and statutory duty, 
under the APA, to say what the law is. Justice Gorsuch starts 
by discussing Brand X’s tension with the separation of 
powers: “By Brand X’s own telling . . . a judicial declaration 
of the law’s meaning in a case or controversy before it is not 
‘authoritative,’ but is instead subject to revision by a 
politically accountable branch of government.”78 This is, after 
all, precisely what had happened to Justice Gorsuch in the 
case of Mr. Padilla-Caldera. After the Tenth Circuit had 
declared the immigration statutes’ meaning and issued its 
holding, “an executive agency was permitted to (and did) tell 
us to reverse our decision like some sort of super court of 
appeals.”79 Justice Gorsuch stated that “[i]f that doesn’t 
qualify as an unconstitutional revision of a judicial 
declaration of the law by a political branch, I confess I begin 
to wonder whether we’ve forgotten what might.”80 
Justice Gorsuch continued with what he believed the 
proper solution should have been. Instead of the agency 
being able to change the law: “When the political branches 
disagree with a judicial interpretation of existing law, the 
Constitution prescribes the appropriate remedial process. 
It’s called legislation. Admittedly, the legislative process can 
be an arduous one. But that’s no bug in the constitutional 
 
on the shift of political winds and still prevail. Neither, too, will agencies 
always deign to announce their views in advance; often enough they seek 
to impose their “reasonable” new interpretations only retroactively in 
administrative adjudications. 
Id. at 1152. 
 78. Id. at 1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 79. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-
Caldera I), 426 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and superseded on reh’g by 
453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 80. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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design: it is the very point of the design.”81 Then, Justice 
Gorsuch came to the heart of the issue. “Of course, Brand X 
asserts that its rule about judicial deference to executive 
revisions follows logically ‘from Chevron itself’ . . . . But 
acknowledging this much only brings the colossus now fully 
into view.”82 Justice Gorsuch’s problem is ultimately not with 
Brand X, but with Chevron deference itself. 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence also cited to the APA to 
further his critique of the abdication of judicial duty 
argument. Section 706 of the APA outlines the standards by 
which a court should determine the validity of an agency 
action in reviewing its proceedings.83 Section 706 requires 
that courts “decide all relevant questions of law” and 
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”84 Yet, 
according to Justice Gorsuch, the APA is not being followed: 
“[R]ather than completing the task expressly assigned to us, 
rather than ‘interpret[ing] . . . statutory provisions,’ 
declaring what the law is, and overturning inconsistent 
agency action, Chevron step two tells us we must allow an 
executive agency to resolve the meaning of any ambiguous 
statutory provision. In this way, Chevron seems no less than 
a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial 
duty.”85 
Justice Gorsuch’s reliance on the APA is an example of 
another formalist argument—as opposed to acknowledging 
the legal realism of the courts adjusting to the complexities 
of the existing administrative state. However, once again, 
this argument is not simply formalistic; it serves to reject the 
growth of the administrative state. 
 
 81. Id. at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 83. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 84. Id.; Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing 
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)). 
 85. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151–52 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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Turning to Justice Gorsuch’s second argument against 
Chevron, the “nondelegation argument,” Justice Gorsuch 
argues that the amount of interpretive authority that 
Chevron vests in agencies violates the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine. Recall that the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine has as its opposite the intelligible 
principle argument, and that the intelligible principle 
argument assumes that Congress delegated enough of an 
intelligible principle in order to make Chevron deference 
constitutional in the majority of cases. Justice Gorsuch seeks 
to respond to the intelligible principle argument and the 
implied delegation rationale for Chevron by writing: 
“Chevron says that we should infer from any statutory 
ambiguity Congress’s ‘intent’ to ‘delegate’ its ‘legislative 
authority’ to the executive to make ‘reasonable’ policy 
choices,”86 but this delegation to the executive branch is 
merely implied,87 while, by contrast, an express delegation to 
the courts exists. Citing to the APA again, Justice Gorsuch 
writes that “Congress expressly vested the courts with the 
responsibility to ‘interpret . . . statutory provisions’ and 
overturn agency action inconsistent with those 
interpretations.”88 Couple this with the fact that “not a word 
can be found here about delegating legislative authority to 
agencies,” and “how can anyone fairly say that Congress 
‘intended’ for courts to abdicate their statutory duty under 
§ 706 and instead ‘intended’ to delegate away its legislative 
power to executive agencies?”89 
Justice Gorsuch invokes the nondelegation argument 
 
 86. Id. at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). 
 87. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“But where exactly has Congress expressed 
this intent?”). 
 88. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
 89. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch then admits that “Chevron’s 
claim about legislative intentions is no more than a fiction.” Id. Many judges and 
legal scholars agree that this claim is a legal fiction, but accept it nonetheless 
because, among other advantages, it provides the background rule of law against 
which Congress can legislate. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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when he takes his argument a step further. Justice Gorsuch 
writes that, assuming for the sake of argument that 
Congress did delegate its legislative authority to executive 
agencies under Chevron, the question then becomes 
“can Congress really delegate its legislative authority—its 
power to write new rules of general applicability—to 
executive agencies?”90 
Justice Gorsuch’s gut reaction is to answer no, Congress 
cannot delegate its legislative authority to executive 
agencies, even though Chevron’s essential purpose is to 
“delegate legislative power to the executive branch.”91 
Importantly, he concedes that the law in “recent times” 
involves the rule of the “intelligible principle,” which, in his 
words, means that the Court has “suggested” that “Congress 
may allow the executive to make new rules of general 
applicability that look a great deal like legislation, so long as 
the controlling legislation contains an ‘intelligible principle’ 
that ‘clearly delineates the general policy’ the agency is to 
apply and ‘the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.’”92 
“This means Congress must at least ‘provide substantial 
guidance on setting . . . standards that affect the entire 
national economy.’”93 
Yet, nondelegation remains a problem for Justice 
Gorsuch: “But even taking the forgiving intelligible principle 
test as a given, it’s no small question whether Chevron can 
 
 90. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reminding 
the readers of Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892), for the proposition that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that under the Constitution ‘Congress 
cannot delegate legislative power to the president’ and that this ‘principle [is] 
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of 
government ordained by the constitution.’”). 
 91. Id. at 1154 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 372–73 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 93. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 457, 475 (2001)). 
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clear it.”94 Justice Gorsuch does not believe that the requisite 
substantial guidance exists when an agency has the power to 
“enact a new rule of general applicability affecting huge 
swaths of the national economy one day and reverse itself the 
next.”95 Citing to the 1935 Schechter decision, Justice 
Gorsuch writes that “[t]he Supreme Court once unanimously 
declared that a statute affording the executive the power to 
write an industrial code of competition for the poultry 
industry violated the separation of powers. And if that’s the 
case, you might ask how is it that Chevron—a rule that 
invests agencies with pretty unfettered power to regulate a 
lot more than chicken—can evade the chopping block.”96 
Justice Gorsuch’s main concern seems to be that an 
administrative agency’s ability under Chevron and Brand X 
to “set and revise policy (legislative), override adverse 
judicial determinations (judicial), and exercise enforcement 
discretion (executive)” has created an administrative state 
that can supersede any branch of the government.97 At the 
end of his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch asks, “what would 
happen in a world without Chevron?”98 In practice, his 
answer is not much, but in principle, a return to pre-Chevron 
administrative law would restore the proper constitutional 
arrangement and the rule-of-law protections it was meant to 
secure.99 Justice Gorsuch’s resolution would be to overturn 
Chevron or, in the very least, afford less deference to agencies 
under Chevron.100 
 
 94. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. at 1155 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–42 (1935)). 
 97. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 1158 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 99. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 100. Scholar Eric Citron raises the interesting argument that “Gorsuch’s two 
best-known decisions on administrative law—Gutierrez-Brizuela and De Niz 
Robles v. Lynch—both involve one of the weakest possible contexts in which to 
defend Chevron doctrine.” By this Citron means that because the administrative 
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While Justice Gorsuch raises a good separation of powers 
point in criticizing the ability, post-Brand X, for agencies to 
effectively overrule a court, this is distinguishable from his 
objections to Chevron generally and from the major questions 
doctrine. The major questions doctrine has been invoked to 
remove agency deference in situations not when there has 
been an executive revision of a court’s rule, but in cases of 
first impression for both the court and the agency. For 
example, in Brown & Williamson, which will be discussed in 
more detail later, the Court invoked the major questions 
doctrine so that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
was not the entity that interpreted whether or not tobacco 
was a drug within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).101 Similarly, in King v. Burwell, 
the Court invoked the major questions doctrine so that the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) was not the entity that 
interpreted whether tax credits were available on State 
Exchanges.102 In the same vein, Justice Gorsuch’s 
 
agency at issue in both cases was the Board of Immigration Appeals—“the 
primary function of which is just to decide the host of quasi-judicial immigration 
cases that must be adjudicated throughout the nation”—“no real issue of 
technical judgment or agency expertise” was involved. “Gorsuch’s next best-
known administrative law decision shares this feature.” United States v. Nichols, 
784 F.3d 666, (10th Cir. 2015), similarly involved “the power of a non-technical 
administrator (the attorney general) to create retroactive effects on individuals,” 
this time, involving the interpretation of a criminal statute. Citron argues that 
this exposure is different than the agencies commonplace in D.C. that were the 
reason behind Chevron:  
The core case for Chevron thus comes from big policy statutes that 
broadly create or empower federal agencies with technical expertise—
statutes like the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (EPA); the Federal 
Communications Act (Federal Communications Commission); the 
Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission); the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Food and Drug 
Administration); or the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration). 
Eric Citron, The roots and limits of Gorsuch’s views on Chevron deference, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/ 
03/roots-limits-gorsuchs-views-chevron-deference/. 
 101. See infra notes 131–43 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra notes 169–206 and accompanying text. 
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underlying concern with and real objection to Chevron—that 
he believes the Court should be the entity to answer the 
question to begin with—is not quite the same as believing 
that an agency should not be able to overrule a court. 
This Article returns and responds to Justice Gorsuch’s 
nondelegation argument in Part III. But first, it is important 
to examine the major questions doctrine because, despite not 
explicitly mentioning the major questions doctrine, Justice 
Gorsuch’s concurrence could easily be considered fuel for its 
use in Supreme Court jurisprudence.103 The major questions 
doctrine is often phrased as an “exception” to Chevron 
deference. Scholars have argued that the major questions 
doctrine is a new way for the Court to handle what it 
perceives as unconstitutional delegations by Congress.104 
While, at the moment, the doctrine seems to be reserved for 
only the most “extraordinary”105 of cases, its resurgence, 
fueled by critics of Chevron who are now sitting on the bench, 
may signal a more prevalent place for its use. 
B. Major Questions Doctrine as a Manifestation of Chevron 
Criticism 
In addition to Chevron being a continuous subject of 
debate among judges and scholars, the Court itself has 
reshaped the doctrine over the years since its inception. 
 
 103. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence was published in 2015, as was the decision 
in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 104. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 593, 630–31 (1992) (arguing that many of the substantive canons, 
such as nondelegation, are judicial efforts to give vitality to under-enforced 
constitutional norms); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 6, at 20–21, 53 (“Although 
the Court has effectively given up policing the nondelegation doctrine directly, 
the Court is still concerned about agencies making important policy choices. So 
the Court has attempted to craft a new canon of statutory construction to 
minimize what it perceives to be excessive delegation. . . . Accordingly, while not 
striking down statutes under the nondelegation doctrine, the Court has 
nonetheless wielded the elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine to limit delegations of 
authority.”). 
 105. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
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Among the additions to the original Chevron doctrine106 is 
the exception for a class of cases for which Chevron deference 
does not apply at all. First established in the 1990s, this is 
the major questions doctrine. The major questions doctrine 
has manifested in the Court for the same reasons that 
Justice Gorsuch has criticized Chevron. Both criticize the 
rule of deference to administrative decision making. 
In an effort to rein in Chevron deference in certain cases 
and re-establish judicial authority, the major questions 
doctrine arises when an agency acts based on its 
interpretation of the statute in question, and the reviewing 
court rejects deference to the agency’s interpretation that 
would otherwise be available under Chevron by pointing to 
the significance of the question involved. The most recent, 
well-known occurrence of the major questions doctrine is in 
King v. Burwell, in which the Court upheld an Affordable 
Care Act regulation promulgated by the IRS—not by 
granting the IRS deference, but by stating that Chevron was 
wholly inapplicable and interpreting the statutory ambiguity 
for itself.107 The Court stated it was able to do this because 
the question was one of “deep ‘economic and political 
significance’”108 and “[h]ad Congress wished to assign that 
question to an agency, it surely would have done so 
expressly.”109 
The most simple iteration of the major questions doctrine 
is that in questions involving “deep ‘economic and political 
significance’” the Court will not defer to an agency’s 
 
 106. One example is adding Step Zero in Mead. See United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). Another, arguably, is Chevron Step One-And-
A-Half. See Daniel J. Hemel and Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-And-A-
Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 757 (2017) (arguing that an intermediate step 
between Chevron Steps One and Two exists, which asks: “Did the agency 
recognize that the statutory provision is ambiguous?”). 
 107. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
 108. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 
302, 324 (2014)). 
 109. Id. (quoting UARG, 573 U.S. at 324). 
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interpretation unless Congress has explicitly stated so.110 
The 1990 and early 2000s cases where the doctrine first 
appeared are MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,111 Food & Drug Administration 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,112 and Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency.113 
Shortly after this line of cases, however, the major questions 
doctrine became dormant, causing scholars to question 
whether the doctrine was dead.114 But its resurgence in 2014 
and 2015—most notably in King v. Burwell115—proved this 
was far from the case. 
As will be explicated in Part III, the major questions 
doctrine cases often illustrate a judicial policy choice to not 
defer to agencies. The Court could have let the agency 
answer the question, but it believed the issue was of such 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (MCI), 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 112. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Brown & Williamson), 529 
U.S. 120 (2000). 
 113. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302 (2014). Whitman 
v. American Trucking Association, Inc. is arguably another major questions 
doctrine case. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In Whitman, respondents, private parties and 
several states, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
revised air quality standards under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) on several grounds. 
Id. at 462–63. The Court first held that the CAA’s delegation of authority to the 
EPA to set air quality standards at a level “requisite to protect the public health” 
was not unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 465. But the Court 
also held that, contrary to respondents’ argument that the CAA requires the EPA 
to consider costs in setting air quality standards, “Congress, we have held, does 
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” 
Id. at 468 (citing to MCI, 512 U.S. at 231; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–
60). 
 114. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” 
Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why 
Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008). Moncrieff 
states that Massachusetts v. EPA signaled the death of the major questions 
doctrine. Id. at 594, 598. 
 115. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. The other recent case in which the 
major questions doctrine has been invoked is Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 
in 2014. 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
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significance that it should be the entity that has the 
authority to decide the issue instead. The major questions 
doctrine is not only a manifestation of Chevron criticism 
generally, but more specifically, it is arguably a 
manifestation of the nondelegation argument, because the 
Court is concluding that Congress would not have delegated 
a question of such “deep economic and political significance” 
to the agency. For example, in Burwell, the Court ultimately 
reached the same conclusion as the agency in interpreting 
the Affordable Care Act, but by taking away agency 
deference, it eliminated the opportunity for a future agency 
to reverse the decision. 
Critics of the major questions doctrine point out that its 
invocation seems to be arbitrary or inconsistent,116 not only 
in the decision of which cases to invoke the doctrine,117 but 
also in the way it is applied in the cases where that decision 
is made. For example, as will be discussed, in both MCI and 
Brown & Williamson, the major questions doctrine was 
invoked during the Court’s analysis of Chevron Step One.118 
In UARG, the major questions doctrine was invoked at 
Chevron Step Two. And in Burwell, it was invoked at 
Chevron Step Zero. These inconsistencies could signal that 
the major questions doctrine is merely a smokescreen for 
 
 116. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 488. 
 117. Determining which questions are of “deep economic and political 
significance” is a vague standard. See, e.g., David Gammage, Foreword—King v. 
Burwell Symposium: Comments on the Commentaries (and on Some Elephants in 
the Room), 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (2015); Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) 
Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57 (2015). 
 118. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 488 (“In both MCI and Brown & 
Williamson, the Court applied the doctrine within Chevron’s Step One 
analysis. . . . Thus, in its original form, the major questions doctrine constituted 
a narrow expansion of the Chevron framework whereby the Court, in its Chevron 
Step One analysis, measured the degree to which the issue at hand was ‘major’ 
to help determine whether the statutory language was plain and unambiguous.”); 
Christopher J. Walker, Toward A Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. 
REV. 1095, 1101 (2016) (“Similarly, Brown & Williamson, on which both UARG 
and King relied, applied the major questions doctrine within the two-step 
framework at Step One.”). 
2019] DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER 1105 
policy judgments by the Court, which necessarily results in 
an enhancement of the Court’s own interpretive power. 
1. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co. (MCI) was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court invoked the major questions doctrine.119 This 
case involved the proper interpretation of the term “modify” 
under § 203(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. The 
Communications Act of 1934 stated that communications 
common carriers—such as AT&T—were required to file 
tariffs with the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) and then charge customers pursuant to those tariff 
rates.120 But the Act also authorized the FCC to “modify” this 
requirement “in its discretion and for good cause shown.”121 
The FCC argued that because of this discretion to modify, it 
could make this requirement voluntary.122 The factual 
occurrence that led to the filing of the MCI case was that in 
the 1980s, the FCC relieved non-dominant long-distance 
carriers from filing tariffs, which left only AT&T subject to 
this filing requirement.123 
The question before the Court was whether the FCC’s 
authority allowed it to interpret the word “modify” to excuse 
the other carriers from filing tariffs.124 With Justice Scalia 
writing the majority opinion, the Court cited Chevron briefly 
in its opinion, but stated that contextual indications were 
also important, “which in the present cases . . . contradict 
 
 119. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); see also 
Leske, supra note 5, at 485; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 236. 
 120. MCI, 512 U.S. at 220. 
 121. Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV)). 
 122. Id. at 225–26. 
 123. Id. at 221–22. 
 124. Id. at 220. 
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petitioners’ position.”125 The Court noted that “[r]ate filings 
are . . . the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated 
industry.”126 Because the filing requirement “was Congress’s 
chosen means of preventing unreasonableness and 
discrimination in charges,”127 the Court rejected the FCC’s 
construction, which it deemed a “fundamental revision of the 
statute.”128 
Characterizing its holding as falling under Chevron Step 
One, the Court found “not the slightest doubt” that Congress 
had directly spoken on this issue.129 Invoking the major 
questions doctrine, the Court concluded: “It is highly unlikely 
that Congress would leave the determination of whether an 
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-
regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that 
it would achieve that through such a subtle device as 
permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”130 
2. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
Brown & Williamson was decided six years after MCI.131 
The simple issue before the Court was whether the FDA had 
the authority to regulate tobacco products.132 The FDA 
previously concluded that tobacco came within the scope of 
the term “drug” as defined by the FDCA which included 
“articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body.”133 This, in turn, meant that the 
 
 125. Id. at 226. 
 126. Id. at 231. 
 127. Id. at 230. 
 128. Id. at 231–32. 
 129. Id. at 228. The Court does not, however, explicitly cite to Chevron, here. 
Nonetheless, whether Congress has spoken on the issue in question is a Step One 
inquiry. 
 130. Id. at 231. 
 131. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 132. Id. at 125. 
 133. Id. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. III)). 
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FDA could regulate tobacco products’ promotion, labeling, 
and accessibility to children and adolescents.134 Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation filed suit challenging the 
FDA’s regulations. 
In holding that Congress had not given the FDA the 
authority to regulate tobacco products, the Supreme Court 
turned to a Chevron analysis: “A threshold issue is the 
appropriate framework for analyzing the FDA’s assertion of 
authority to regulate tobacco products.”135 “Because this case 
involves an administrative agency’s construction of a statute 
that it administers, our analysis is governed by 
Chevron . . . .”136 
Notably, however, that was not the end of the Court’s 
analysis. The Court also stated other principles that were 
pertinent to the case before it. Towards the end of the 
opinion, the Court wrote that its Step One analysis—“our 
inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue”—was “shaped . . . by the nature of 
the question presented.”137 Referencing and then narrowing 
Chevron’s implied delegation rationale, the Court stated: 
“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a 
statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a 
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”138 “In 
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to 
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such 
 
 134. Id. at 125. 
 135. Id. at 132. 
 136. Id. “Under Chevron, a reviewing court must first ask ‘whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’ If Congress has done so, the 
inquiry is at an end; the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.’ But if Congress has not specifically addressed the question, 
a reviewing court must respect the agency’s construction of the statute so long as 
it is permissible.” Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)) (internal citations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 159. 
 138. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
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an implicit delegation.”139 
In the Court’s view, Brown & Williamson was an 
extraordinary case.140 Tobacco had a “unique place in 
American history and society,” which led “Congress, for 
better or for worse . . . to preclude any agency from 
exercising significant policymaking authority in the area.”141 
In its reasoning, the Court found MCI to be instructive: “As 
in MCI, we are confident that Congress could not have 
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political 
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”142 The 
Court thus concluded that Congress had directly spoken to 
the issue and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco 
products.143 
3. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental 
Protection (UARG) was decided in 2014 and marked the first 
time the Court applied the major questions doctrine since 
2001.144 This was also the first time the Court applied the 
doctrine outside of its Chevron Step One analysis. The 
invocation of the major questions doctrine came in the 
Court’s Chevron Step Two analysis in UARG.145 
 
 139. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and 
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (“A court may also ask whether the legal 
question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and 
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer 
themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration”)). 
 140. Id. (“This is hardly an ordinary case.”). 
 141. Id. at 159–60. 
 142. Id. at 160. The Court stressed, no matter how serious the issue, “an 
administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be 
grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.” Id. at 123. 
 143. Id. at 160–61. 
 144. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (UARG). 
 145. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 494 (“Thus, the Court twice addressed 
the major questions doctrine in its Chevron Step Two analysis, but with different 
results.”); Walker, supra note 118, at 1101 (“Justice Scalia’s invocation of the 
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA,146 which held that air pollution was subject to 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulation under 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), the Court granted certiorari to 
hear challenges to these regulations. The specific question in 
UARG was whether the EPA’s promulgation of greenhouse 
gas (“GHG”) emission standards for new motor vehicles 
compelled the agency to regulate certain “stationary sources” 
of GHG emissions, such as power plants or industrial 
facilities.147 Alternatively, even if the EPA was not compelled 
to regulate these stationary sources, the Court also 
considered whether the EPA was permitted to do so under 
the CAA.148 
The Court broke down its analysis even further, 
resulting in a fairly complex decision,149 but, for the purposes 
of this Article, what is significant is that the majority opinion 
stated that its review of the EPA’s interpretations of the CAA 
was governed by Chevron150 and that the major questions 
doctrine was invoked not during the Court’s Step One 
analysis, but under Step Two. 
Under Chevron Step One, the Court concluded that the 
 
major questions doctrine took place . . . as part of the Step Two inquiry in 
UARG.”). 
 146. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Many scholars note that the 
Court had the chance to invoke the major questions doctrine in this case but chose 
not to, which led some to believe the doctrine was dead or dormant. See, e.g., 
Moncrieff, supra note 114, at 607. 
 147. UARG, 573 U.S. at 314. 
 148. Id. at 321. 
 149. See id. at 314–15 (“This litigation presents two distinct challenges to 
EPA’s stance on greenhouse-gas permitting for stationary sources. First, we must 
decide whether EPA permissibly determined that a source may be subject to the 
PSD and Title V permitting requirements on the sole basis of the source’s 
potential to emit greenhouse gases. Second, we must decide whether EPA 
permissibly determined that a source already subject to the PSD program 
because of its emission of conventional pollutants (an ‘anyway’ source) may be 
required to limit its greenhouse-gas emissions by employing the ‘best available 
control technology’ for greenhouse gases.”). 
 150. Id. at 315. 
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CAA was ambiguous, thus rejecting the EPA’s argument that 
under the plain language of the CAA, a source not otherwise 
regulated because of its emissions of conventional pollutants 
must be subject to applicable permitting requirements based 
solely on its potential to emit greenhouse gases.151 
Disagreeing, the Court found that there was “no insuperable 
textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in 
the permitting triggers [of the CAA] to encompass only 
pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be 
sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to 
exclude [GHGs] that are emitted in such vast quantities that 
their inclusion would radically transform those programs 
and render them unworkable as written.”152 
Then, after rejecting the EPA’s plain language 
argument, the Court turned to Chevron Step Two to 
determine whether the EPA’s interpretation was 
reasonable.153 The Court noted that “reasonable statutory 
interpretation” must consider both “the specific context in 
which . . . language is used” and “the broader context of the 
statute as a whole.”154 Clarifying further, “a statutory 
‘provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often 
clarified by the remainder of the statutory 
scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest 
of the law.’”155 And “an agency interpretation that is 
‘inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as 
a whole’ does not merit deference.”156 
Applying these principles, the Court found that the 
 
 151. Id. at 313–16. 
 152. Id. at 320. 
 153. Id. at 321 (“[W]e next consider the [EPA’s] alternative position that its 
interpretation was justified as an exercise of its ‘discretion’ to adopt ‘a reasonable 
construction of the statute.’”). 
 154. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 155. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 156. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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EPA’s interpretation was incompatible with the regulatory 
scheme as this would “overthrow” the Act’s “structure and 
design.”157 Additionally, this interpretation was contrary to 
Congress’s intent as applied to smaller stationary sources.158 
It was at this point in the Court’s opinion that the Court 
applied the major questions doctrine. Rather than stop at 
Step Two, the Court went on to say that the conclusion that 
the EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable was also 
compelled by the major questions doctrine.159 
“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it 
would bring about an enormous and transformative 
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear 
congressional authorization.”160 The Court cited both MCI 
and Brown & Williamson for the premise that in 
circumstances where an agency’s interpretation impacts “a 
significant portion of the American economy,” courts ought 
to be hesitant in adopting such an interpretation without 
clear direction by Congress.161 The Court was uncomfortable 
 
 157. Id. The Court first pointed to practical reasons: The EPA’s interpretation 
would cause an extreme rise in permit applications, cause administrative costs 
to swell, and decade-long delays that would cause construction projects to grind 
to a halt nationwide. 
 158. Id. at 322–23. According to the Court’s reading of Congress’s intention in 
designing the permitting programs, both the PSD program and Title V of the CAA 
were not meant to apply to smaller stationary sources. Id. at 323 (“Not 
surprisingly, EPA acknowledges that PSD review is a ‘complicated, resource-
intensive, time-consuming, and sometimes contentious process’ suitable for 
‘hundreds of larger sources,’ not ‘tens of thousands of smaller sources.’”) (“As EPA 
wrote, Title V is ‘finely crafted for thousands,’ not millions, of sources.”). 
 159. Id. at 323–24 (“The fact that EPA’s greenhouse-gas-inclusive 
interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers would place plainly excessive 
demands on limited governmental resources is alone a good reason for rejecting 
it; but that is not the only reason.”). 
 160. Id. at 324. 
 161. Id. (“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an 
unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American 
economy’ . . . we typically greet its announcement with a measure of 
skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an 
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” (citing Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60; MCI, 512 U.S. at 231)). 
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with “an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power 
over the national economy while at the same time 
strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would 
render the statute ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that 
designed’ it.”162 Thus, the Court concluded, as part of a major 
questions doctrine analysis, that the EPA’s interpretation 
was unreasonable.163 
The next question before the Court in UARG provides an 
example of the Court applying the major questions doctrine, 
but still allowing the agency’s regulation to stand. At this 
point in the case, the Court still had to determine whether 
the EPA permissibly determined that an “anyway source” (a 
source already subject to the CAA permitting program 
because of its emission of conventional pollutants) “may be 
required to limit its [GHG] emissions” by having to install 
best available control technology (“BACT”).164 Similar to the 
previous analysis, the Court found that under Step One of 
Chevron, the BACT provision was unambiguous and did 
indeed apply to GHG emissions from “anyway sources.”165 
Again, the Court’s analysis could have ended there, this 
time at Step One. But instead, the Court went on to say that 
even if the plain text of the BACT provision “were not clear,” 
the EPA’s interpretation was not unreasonable under 
Chevron Step Two.166 This was not a “major question” 
because “applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so 
disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a 
dramatic expansion of agency authority.”167 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (“Since, as we hold above, the statute does not compel EPA’s 
interpretation, it would be patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for 
EPA to insist on seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not 
designed to grant.”). 
 164. Id. at 315–16. 
 165. Id. at 330–32. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 332. 
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In sum, the Court struck down an EPA interpretation of 
the CAA because the issue was one of “vast ‘economic and 
political significance’” and the EPA’s interpretation “would 
bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in 
EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional 
authorization.”168 
4. King v. Burwell 
The most recent case to invoke the major questions 
doctrine was King v. Burwell in 2015.169 Burwell upheld a 
regulation promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) that interpreted a key provision of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).170 Before 
reviewing the Court’s analysis, some background is 
necessary to understand the contours of the case and to 
suggest why the Court believed the major questions doctrine 
was relevant. 
The ACA was enacted to increase the number of 
Americans covered by health insurance and to decrease the 
cost of health care. In order to accomplish these goals, the 
ACA adopted three “interlocking” reforms that applied to all 
states: (1) insurance market regulations; (2) a coverage 
mandate; and (3) tax credits.171 
The first reform, the insurance market regulations, “bars 
insurers from denying coverage to any person because of his 
health”172 and “bars insurers from charging a person higher 
premiums for the same reason.”173 The second reform, the 
coverage mandate, requires that individuals maintain health 
 
 168. Id. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160). 
 169. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2482. 
 172. Id. This is known as the “guaranteed issue” requirement. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg–1(a). 
 173. Id. This is known as the “community rating” requirement. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg. 
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insurance coverage or pay a penalty to the IRS.174 The second 
reform was enacted as an incentive to avoid the problem of 
individuals waiting to purchase health insurance until they 
were sick.175 This coverage mandate “minimize[d] this 
adverse selection and broaden[ed] the health insurance risk 
pool to include healthy individuals, which [would] lower 
health insurance premiums.”176 Congress also provided an 
exemption from the coverage requirement for anyone who 
has to spend more than eight percent of his or her income on 
health insurance.177 
The third reform, the tax credits, sought to make 
insurance more affordable to low income individuals. 
Individuals with household incomes between 100 and 400 
percent of the federal poverty line were able to purchase 
insurance with tax credits, which were provided directly to 
the insurer.178 The Court noted the importance of how closely 
intertwined these three reforms were: “Congress found that 
the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements 
would not work without the coverage requirement. And the 
coverage requirement would not work without the tax 
credits.”179 
Lastly, in addition to the three reforms, the ACA 
required the creation of an “Exchange” in each state. An 
Exchange acted as a marketplace where people could 
compare and purchase insurance plans.180 “The Act gives 
each State the opportunity to establish its own Exchange, 
 
 174. Id. at 2486 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)). 
 177. Id. at 2486–87 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii)). 
 178. Id. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081, 18082). 
 179. Id. (internal citation omitted). The reason all three reforms had to be in 
place to work was because “without the tax credits, the cost of buying insurance 
would exceed eight percent of income for a large number of individuals, which 
would exempt them from the coverage requirement.” Id. 
 180. Id. 
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but provides that the Federal Government will establish the 
Exchange if the State does not.”181 
The issue before the Court in Burwell was “whether the 
Act’s tax credits are available in States that have a Federal 
Exchange,” so that “the Act’s interlocking reforms apply 
equally in each State no matter who establishes the State’s 
Exchange.”182 
The ACA initially states that tax credits “shall be 
allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer.”183 Subsequently, in 
what seems like a contradiction, the ACA provides that the 
“amount of the tax credit depends in part on whether the 
taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through ‘an 
Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.’”184 
The IRS issued a regulation that made tax credits 
available on both State and Federal Exchanges.185 
Specifically, the IRS interpreted the provision to determine 
tax credit eligibility based on enrollment in an insurance 
plan through “an Exchange,” which it defined as “an 
Exchange serving the individual market . . . regardless of 
whether the Exchange is established and operated by a 
State . . . or by HHS.”186 
Petitioners challenging the IRS interpretation were 
individuals living in a state that had a Federal Exchange 
who did not wish to purchase health insurance.187 Their 
 
 181. Id. at 2485. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 2487 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)). 
 184. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)–(c)) (emphasis in original). 
 185. Id. (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 30378 (2012)). 
 186. Id. (quoting 26 CFR § 1.36B-2 (2013) and 45 CFR § 155.20 (2014)). 
 187. Id. If Virginia’s Exchange did not qualify as “an Exchange established by 
the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031],” Petitioners would not receive any tax 
credits. If they did not receive the tax credits, the cost of buying insurance would 
be “more than eight percent of their income, which would exempt them from the 
Act’s coverage requirement.” Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)). 
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argument was that the tax credits were not available for 
individuals who enrolled in insurance plans through a 
Federal Exchange because, based on the ACA, a Federal 
Exchange is not “an Exchange established by the State under 
[42 U.S.C. § 18031].”188 
The Supreme Court noted a circuit split that resulted in 
differing applicability of the tax credits. In this case, the 
Fourth Circuit viewed the Act as “ambiguous and subject to 
at least two different interpretations,” ultimately deferring 
to the IRS’s interpretation under Chevron.189 On the same 
day that the Fourth Circuit issued its decision, the D.C. 
Circuit struck down the IRS Rule, holding under Chevron 
Step One that the ACA “unambiguously restricts” the tax 
credits to state Exchanges.190 
Rather than side with one of the two circuits and conduct 
its analysis under Chevron, though, the Supreme Court 
found for the first time that the application of the major 
questions doctrine rendered Chevron wholly inapplicable.191 
Quoting Brown & Williamson, the Court wrote that 
applicability of Chevron is “premised on the theory that the 
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps,” and “[i]n 
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate 
before concluding that Congress has intended such an 
implicit delegation.”192 
According to the Court, this was such a case.193 The 
Court stated that the tax credits were among the ACA’s “key 
reforms,” which involved “billions of dollars in spending each 
year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 2488. 
 190. Id. (citing Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (2014)). 
 191. Id. at 2488–89. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 2489. 
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of people.”194 Quoting UARG, the question of whether the tax 
credits were available on Federal Exchanges was thus “a 
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is 
central to this statutory scheme.”195 “[H]ad Congress wished 
to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have 
done so expressly.”196 The Court considered it even more 
unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to 
the IRS, “which has no expertise in crafting health insurance 
policy of this sort.”197 The Court concluded: “This is not a case 
for the IRS.”198 
In concluding, the Court necessarily gave the power to 
interpret the ACA to the Court itself.199 Reverting to 
traditional principles of statutory interpretation such as 
enforcing the plain language of the statute and reading the 
words in context “with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme,”200 the Court ultimately concluded that 
the ACA “allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any 
Exchange created under the Act.”201 
Burwell is different from the previous cases that invoked 
the major questions doctrine because of both how and when 
the doctrine was invoked. MCI and Brown & Williamson 
invoked the major questions doctrine as part of the Step One 
inquiry.202 UARG invoked the major questions doctrine as 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324 
(2014)). 
 196. Id. (citing UARG, 573 U.S. at 324). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. (“It is instead our task to determine the correct reading of Section 
36B.”) (emphasis added). 
 200. Id. (“Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.’”). 
 201. Id. at 2496. 
 202. In Brown & Williamson, the Court went back and characterized its 
holding in MCI as falling within the Step One inquiry: “We rejected the FCC’s 
construction, finding ‘not the slightest doubt’ that Congress had directly spoken 
to the question.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 
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part of the Step Two inquiry.203 However, despite being 
invoked at different steps within the Chevron analysis, the 
major questions doctrine was still invoked as a step within 
the Chevron analysis in those cases. In other words, the 
Court still defaulted to Chevron and held that Chevron 
applied. Burwell, however, invoked the major questions 
doctrine as a threshold, Step Zero inquiry,204 finding instead 
that Chevron does not apply. 
In Burwell, the Court concluded that the statute was 
ambiguous and that the agency’s interpretation was 
reasonable. That could have been done through a standard 
Chevron Step One and Step Two analysis. Or, the Court 
could have engaged in a Chevron Step Zero analysis.205 But 
that is not what the Court chose to do. The Court arrived at 
its conclusion by deciding that it—the Court, rather than the 
agency—was the entity with the power to interpret the 
statutory ambiguity.206 And it did so by invoking the major 
questions doctrine. It is of some significance that the Court 
 
(2000) (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 
(1994)). Then, the Court concluded the same for the case before it as well, holding 
that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 159. 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n also invoked the major questions doctrine 
as part of the Step One inquiry. 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (“The text of § 109(b), 
interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its 
importance to the [Clean Air Act] as a whole, unambiguously bars cost 
considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us 
as well as the EPA.”). 
 203. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable 
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in 
EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.”). 
 204. Without attempting to explain why the Court applies the major questions 
doctrine at different points of its Chevron analysis, as that is beyond the scope of 
this Article, two scholars interestingly observed the impact this decision could 
make. See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax 
Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 40 (noting that the application of the major 
questions doctrine at Step Zero or Step One—as opposed to Step Two—has the 
additional benefit of “foreclos[ing] a subsequent presidential administration from 
reinterpreting the statute via regulation to prohibit tax subsidies in exchanges 
established by the Federal Government”). 
 205. See Part III.B.2. 
 206. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
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invoked the major questions doctrine to take away agency 
deference only to come to the same conclusion as the agency. 
One possible reason for this move in Burwell is that by taking 
away agency discretion, the Court eliminated the possibility 
of agency reversal in interpretation of the Affordable Care 
Act in a new presidential administration. 
III. POLICY JUDGMENTS THAT SERVE TO ENHANCE THE 
COURT’S POWER 
Justice Gorsuch’s remedy for unconstitutional 
delegations under Chevron207 is essentially the same remedy 
that the major questions doctrine has been effectuating in 
the Court: have the Court be the entity that answers the 
question at hand, rather than the agency. However, this does 
not solve the problem of unconstitutional delegations. 
According to Justice Gorsuch, Chevron violates the 
separation of powers because it allows Congress to 
unconstitutionally delegate too much of its power to 
executive agencies. However, if the remedy is not a judicial 
invalidation of the delegation on constitutional grounds—
which, it is not under both Justice Gorsuch’s view and the 
major questions doctrine—then this Article argues that what 
really underlies the arguments over Chevron’s existence are 
policy disagreements over the proper role of the current 
administrative state. 
A. “Re-Routing Delegation to the Courts,” Not Congress 
Justice Gorsuch’s second argument against Chevron 
from his Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence was that the 
amount of interpretive authority Chevron vests in agencies 
violates the nondelegation doctrine.208 This Article claims 
that Justice Gorsuch’s argument fails because, assuming 
there was an unconstitutional delegation by Congress to 
 
 207. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 208. See id. 
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begin with,209 re-routing the authority to answer the 
question from the executive agency to the Court does not 
make the delegation constitutional. 
Asher Steinberg also acknowledges that, in responding 
to Chevron’s premise (that statutory ambiguities delegate 
interstitial lawmaking authority to the executive), Justice 
Gorsuch “suggests the delegations Chevron presupposes are 
unconstitutional under even the current instantiation of the 
nondelegation doctrine, to which no statute has fallen victim 
in eighty years.”210 Again, assuming for the sake of argument 
that Justice Gorsuch is correct about the unconstitutionality 
of the delegations that Congress gives to agencies, Justice 
Gorsuch’s remedy is misguided. The proper remedy would be 
to send the question back to Congress, but Justice Gorsuch 
is clear that he believes the Court should be the one to 
answer it. As Steinberg surmises: 
The remedy for an unconstitutional delegation is to invalidate the 
delegation and suggest that Congress write a clearer law. Judge 
Gorsuch seems to think an equally good remedy is to pretend the 
delegation isn’t there. Holding that courts get to decide the meaning 
of an indeterminate term like “stationary source” or “sexual abuse 
of a minor” wouldn’t make the delegations embedded in those 
indeterminacies go away; it would just re-route the delegations to 
courts, a result that (besides not being what Congress wanted or 
making any practical sense) isn’t any more constitutional than 
letting agencies keep them. Courts, to be sure, would claim they 
were finding what “sexual abuse of a minor” and the like “really” 
meant, but who besides Judge Gorsuch would believe them?211 
Steinberg borrows a quote from Justice Gorsuch’s 
predecessor to further demonstrate his point. In Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the 
 
 209. The intelligible principle argument would conclude otherwise in most 
cases. 
 210. Asher Steinberg, Judge Gorsuch and Chevron Doctrine Part III: The 
Gutierrez-Brizuela Concurring Opinion, NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 29, 2017), 
http://yalejreg.com/ nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-gutierrez-
brizuela-concurring-opinion-by-asher-steinberg/. See id. for a response to all 
“three” arguments in Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence. 
 211. Id. 
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Benzene Case), the Supreme Court avoided a nondelegation 
problem by giving content to a vague statute. Justice Scalia 
later commented on the decision, stating that the Court 
should have struck the statute down or let the agency’s 
interpretation stand.212 Justice Scalia wrote: “In giving 
content to a law which in fact says no more than that OSHA 
should ensure ‘safe places of employment’ (whatever that 
means) and should maximize protection against toxic 
materials ‘to the extent feasible’ (whatever that means), it 
was the plurality of the Court, rather than OSHA, that ended 
up doing legislator’s work.”213 Justice Scalia understood that 
“absent the enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine that he 
came to recognize was unenforceable, denying deference to 
agencies would result in courts doing legislator’s work.”214 
The Benzene Case was not the only time Justice Scalia 
defended Chevron against the nondelegation doctrine. 
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,215 a case that many hoped 
would reestablish the nondelegation doctrine. In Whitman, 
the Court upheld the EPA’s revision of air quality standards 
against a nondelegation challenge.216 The Court held that 
the CAA’s delegation of authority to the EPA to set the air 
quality standards at a level “requisite . . . to protect the 
public health” was not an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.217 The scope of discretion allowed by the 
relevant section of the CAA was held to be “well within the 
outer limits of [our] nondelegation precedents.”218 The Court 
 
 212. Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, A note on the Benzene case, AEI J. ON GOV’T 
& SOC’Y (Aug. 6, 1980, 7:36 p.m.)). 
 213. Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, A note on the Benzene case, AEI J. ON GOV’T 
& SOC’Y (Aug. 6, 1980, 7:36 p.m.)). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. at 475–76. 
 218. Id. at 474. 
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also noted that it has only ever found an “intelligible 
principle” lacking and therefore was required to strike down 
the corresponding statute on nondelegation doctrine grounds 
twice in its history.219 
Justice Scalia defended Chevron against its detractors 
both left and right, seeing it as a useful constraint on activist 
courts. Justice Scalia was opposed to having the Court do the 
legislature’s work. In a 1989 article, Justice Scalia defended 
Chevron by writing that “[b]road delegation to the Executive 
is the hallmark of the modern administrative state,” and 
Chevron provides a “background rule of law against which 
Congress can legislate.”220 Justice Scalia assumed the legal 
fiction of implied delegation—that Congress intends for 
agencies to exercise their discretion: 
Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds 
of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular 
agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known. The 
legislative process becomes less of a sporting event when those 
supporting and opposing a particular disposition do not have to 
gamble upon whether, if they say nothing about it in the statute, 
the ultimate answer will be provided by the courts or rather by the 
Department of Labor.221 
Justice Scalia also considered the fact that agencies can 
change the resolution of these statutory ambiguities as their 
knowledge and the political desires of their constituents 
changes to be a good thing, permitting the “needed 
flexibility” and “appropriate political participation” in the 
administrative process.222 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Scalia, supra note 22, at 516–17. 
 221. Id. at 517. 
 222. Id. 
One of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities 
is that they resolve them for ever and ever; only statutory amendment 
can produce a change. If the word “stationary source” in the Clean Air 
Act did not permit the “bubble concept” today, it would not permit the 
“bubble concept” four years from now either, no matter how much the 
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Justice Gorsuch, on the other hand, advocates for the 
overturn of Chevron, arguing that it is better for the Court to 
do the legislator’s work than the agencies. Justice Gorsuch 
views Chevron as a potential threat to the fundamental 
obligation of the judiciary to interpret statutes and “say what 
the law is.”223 
Justice Gorsuch and others critique Chevron, and many 
use the major questions doctrine to do so, claiming as a 
matter of separation of powers to be returning power to 
Congress when, in reality, they are giving power to the 
courts. However, there is a valid argument that courts 
should not make policy choices. The judiciary is an unelected 
branch, while agencies have political accountability under 
the President. “[W]hen congressional instructions are either 
vague or absent, judges should assume that Congress 
delegated resolution of those statutory ambiguities to the 
Executive. In most such cases, of course, Congress did not 
speak to the question of interpretive authority, either 
explicitly or implicitly, so the delegation is purely fictional—
a judicial presumption.”224 But this “fiction” that Chevron 
deference rests on Congress’s choice to delegate law-
interpreting power to administrative agencies is justified by 
the argument that “a reasonable legislator in the modern 
administrative state would rather give law-interpreting 
 
perception of whether that concept impairs or furthers the objectives of 
the Act may change. Under Chevron, however, “stationary source” can 
mean a range of things, and it is up to the agency, in light of its 
advancing knowledge (and also, to be realistic about it, in light of the 
changing political pressures that it feels from Congress and from its 
various constituencies) to specify the correct meaning. If Congress is to 
delegate broadly, as modern times are thought to demand, it seems to 
me desirable that the delegee be able to suit its actions to the times, and 
that continuing political accountability be assured, through direct 
political pressures upon the Executive and through the indirect political 
pressure of congressional oversight. 
Id. at 517-18. 
 223. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 224. Moncrieff, supra note 114, at 608. 
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power to agencies than to courts.”225 The Chevron opinion 
itself included the greater political accountability of agencies 
and the executive branch as a specific policy reason for the 
courts to defer to agencies.226 
Whether the critique of Chevron is through the 
nondelegation argument that Justice Gorsuch makes in his 
Tenth Circuit Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence, or whether it 
is through the increasingly common invocation of the major 
questions doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence,227 
denying deference to agencies is resulting in courts doing the 
legislator’s work—and often under the guise of preventing 
unconstitutional delegations and restoring the proper 
separation of powers. 
B. How the Court Would Resolve the Issue Absent Invocation 
of the MQD 
As is clear from MCI, Brown & Williamson, UARG, and 
Burwell, one of the larger ramifications of the major 
questions doctrine is the diminution of agency deference and 
the enhancement of the courts’ interpretive role.228 The 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices . . . .”). 
 227. The major questions doctrine is also sometimes rationalized by the 
nondelegation argument. See infra note 6; see also infra note 104 and 
accompanying text. 
 228. With the recent appointments of both Justice Gorsuch and Justice 
Kavanaugh to the bench, both of whom have criticized Chevron deference, see 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149–58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) and Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150–54 
(2016) (raising concerns about Chevron and suggesting limitations to the 
doctrine) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)), there is a 
legitimate threat that the major questions doctrine will be used to further scale 
back Chevron’s domain. See also Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United 
States, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (holding that 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), part of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act, does not violate the nondelegation 
doctrine) and his concurrence in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (upholding 
Auer deference) (where he was joined by Justice Kavanaugh) for recent examples 
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Court has never provided an explanation for why it invokes 
the doctrine at different points in its Chevron analysis.229 
Nor has the Court explained when it will consider a case to 
be of deep economic and political significance. MCI, Brown & 
Williamson, UARG, and Burwell all demonstrate this. 
Rather, the invocation of the doctrine seems only to be 
comprised of “episodes of vaguely equitable intervention, 
where the Court’s ‘olfactory sense detects the odor of 
administrative waywardness.’”230 The major question 
doctrine’s arbitrary and inconsistent application may 
suggest certain implications behind its invocation. 
Taking a closer analysis of Brown & Williamson and 
Burwell, this Section will argue that these cases could have 
been resolved within the Chevron framework and without 
invocation of the major questions doctrine. By reevaluating 
the cases to determine how the Court would resolve the issue 
absent invocation of the major questions doctrine, this 
Section will demonstrate that a possible reason for the 
arbitrariness is because the major questions doctrine is 
acting as a super-strong clear statement rule231 that permits 
 
of arguments in favor of greater judicial control over the administrative state. 
 229. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 488–89 (“[I]n key cases such as MCI and 
Brown & Williamson . . . the Court did not engage in a discussion or elaboration 
of [the major question doctrine’s] contours. Nor was there any mention of how the 
major questions doctrine fit within the Chevron analysis or whether it should be 
applied exclusively at Chevron Step One.”); Major Question Objections, supra 
note 5, at 2197 (“[T]he [major questions] exception has never been justified by 
any coherent rationale.”). 
 230. Major Question Objections, supra note 5, at 2192 (quoting Colin S. Diver, 
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 598 
(1985)). 
 231. As termed by William Eskridge, a “super-strong clear statement rule” 
requires “very specifically targeted ‘clear statements’ on the face of the statute to 
rebut a policy presumption the Court has created.” Eskridge and Frickey, supra 
note 104, at 595 n.4. Contrast this with regular “clear statement rules,” which 
“require a ‘clear statement’ on the face of the statute to rebut a policy 
presumption the Court has created” and “presumptions,” which “are general 
policies the Court will ‘presume’ Congress intends to incorporate into 
statutes . . . [and] can be rebutted by persuasive arguments that the statutory 
text, legislative history, or purpose is inconsistent with the presumptions.” Id. 
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an escape from conclusions that could otherwise be drawn 
using agency power. The clear statement rule is a guideline 
for statutory construction that instructs courts not to 
interpret a statute in a way that will bring about a particular 
result unless the statute makes unmistakably clear its intent 
to achieve that result. Applied in this context, it would be 
read to say that deference will not be given to agencies absent 
unmistakably clear statutory language. Under this 
argument, then, the major questions doctrine acts more as a 
facade for the Court’s separation of power effort to diminish 
administrative power.232 
1. Brown & Williamson Revisited 
In Brown & Williamson, the issue again was whether the 
FDA had the authority to regulate tobacco products. The 
FDA’s position was that it had such authority because the 
FDCA defined drug as including “articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”233 The Court concluded otherwise, though, by 
invoking the major questions doctrine during its application 
of Chevron Step One.234 Because of tobacco’s “unique place in 
 
 232. Justice Gorsuch is not the first person on the bench to question the growth 
of executive agencies’ power. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in City of Arlington v. 
FCC is well-known for his critique of the administrative state. 569 U.S. 290, 313 
(2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting). As surmised by Chief Justice Roberts, agencies 
today “exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of 
law; executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial 
power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those 
found to have violated their rules.” Id. at 312–13 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Add 
that with the improbability that a President has the time or the desire to 
“supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity,” then “the danger posed by the 
growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.” Id. at 313, 315 
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Justice Thomas also 
questioned the Chevron doctrine in his Michigan v. EPA concurrence: “These 
cases bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional 
delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron deference.” 135 
S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 233. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. III)). 
 234. Chevron Step One seeks to ascertain whether the meaning from the 
statute is clear, and if so, then that meaning controls. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. 
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American history and society,” and the lack of an explicit 
delegation from Congress combined with several pieces of 
legislation on tobacco that suggested a congressional intent 
to retain jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress had 
directly spoken to the issue.235 Brown & Williamson was a 
clear statement case because the major questions doctrine 
gave the Court an escape from the conclusion that would 
otherwise be drawn using agency power. The Court stated 
that it could not interpret the FDCA in a way that would 
bring about a result it believed was not intended by 
Congress, especially when that particular result was not 
unmistakably clear from the text of the statute itself. 
Arguably, though, the Court could have decided the issue 
without invoking the major questions doctrine, and instead 
could have relied solely on contextual evidence to inform the 
meaning of the statute under Chevron Step One. In Brown & 
Williamson, there was considerable contextual evidence the 
majority could draw upon of separate statutory 
pronouncements on tobacco regulation that might lead the 
Court to judge that the language in the FDCA permitting the 
FDA to regulate drugs did not include tobacco. This 
contextual evidence included the fact that the FDA 
consistently stated before 1995 that it lacked jurisdiction 
over tobacco,236 that Congress had enacted several tobacco-
specific statutes fully cognizant of the FDA’s position,237 and 
 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 235. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160–61. 
 236. Id. at 144 (pointing to the “FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that 
it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco absent claims of 
therapeutic benefit by the manufacturer”). 
 237. Id. at 143–44. 
Congress has enacted six separate pieces of legislation since 1965 
addressing the problem of tobacco use and human health. . . . Those 
statutes, among other things, require that health warnings appear on 
all packaging and in all print and outdoor advertisements, see 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1333, 4402; prohibit the advertisement of tobacco products 
through “any medium of electronic communication” subject to regulation 
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), see §§ 1335, 4402(f); 
require the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to report 
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that Congress had considered and rejected many bills that 
would have given the agency such authority.238 Thus, the 
Court wrote, “[u]nder these circumstances, it is evident that 
Congress’ tobacco-specific statutes have effectively ratified 
the FDA’s long-held position that it lacks jurisdiction under 
the FDCA to regulate tobacco products. Congress has created 
a distinct regulatory scheme to address the problem of 
tobacco and health, and that scheme, as presently 
constructed, precludes any role for the FDA.”239 
The above could have been enough to find that the 
seemingly clear language in the FDCA permitting the FDA 
to regulate drugs did not include tobacco, ending its inquiry 
at Chevron Step One. Nevertheless, rather than cabining its 
discussion to the plain meaning of the statute—informed by 
these separate statutory pronouncements—the Court went 
beyond Chevron Step One to include a consideration of how 
likely it was that Congress delegated “a policy decision of 
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative 
agency.”240 By invoking the major questions doctrine here, 
the Court limited the role of Chevron and of agency 
determinations more generally. 
2. Burwell Revisited 
Similarly, in King v. Burwell, the Court could have 
reached its conclusion without invocation of the major 
 
every three years to Congress on research findings concerning “the 
addictive property of tobacco,” 42 U.S.C. § 290aa—2(b)(2); and make 
States’ receipt of certain federal block grants contingent on their making 
it unlawful “for any manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of tobacco 
products to sell or distribute any such product to any individual under 
the age of 18,” § 300x—26(a)(1). 
Id. 
 238. Id. at 144 (“[O]n several occasions . . . and after the health consequences 
of tobacco use and nicotine’s pharmacological effects had become well known, 
Congress considered and rejected bills that would have granted the FDA such 
jurisdiction.”). 
 239. Id. For the full recitation of the context of the regulatory scheme 
surrounding tobacco, see the Court’s discussion on pages 143–159. 
 240. Id. at 133. 
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questions doctrine. The issue in Burwell was whether the 
ACA’s tax credits were available in states that had a Federal 
Exchange.241 Prior to Burwell, the IRS issued a regulation 
that made tax credits available on both State and Federal 
Exchanges.242 Invoking the major questions doctrine, the 
Court held that Chevron was wholly inapplicable, as it was 
extremely unlikely that Congress had delegated such “a 
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is 
central to this statutory scheme.”243 
However, a straightforward Chevron Step Zero analysis 
could have viably led to the conclusion that the IRS did not 
have jurisdiction to address health care issues, and thus no 
deference was warranted. Chevron Step Zero asks whether 
the agency has the authority to issue binding legal rules.244 
If the answer is no, Chevron does not apply.245 In Burwell, 
the Court could have analyzed whether the IRS had the 
authority to interpret the Section in question, 36B, which 
was codified in Title 26 of the United States Code, the 
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). What was necessary to 
resolve the issue in Burwell was not simply a 
straightforward interpretation of Section 36B, but the 
interpretation of Section 36B in relation to the remainder of 
the ACA, many of which parts lay outside of the IRC. To 
illustrate: “Section 36B allows an individual to receive tax 
credits only if the individual enrolls in an insurance plan 
through ‘an Exchange established by the State under [42 
U.S.C. § 18031].’”246 In addition, the Court also reviewed 42 
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U.S.C. § 18041 to inform the meaning of Section 36B.247 
These two provisions are codified in Title 42 of the United 
States Code, which is the United States Code dealing with 
public health, social welfare, and civil rights. 
Thus, the Court could have concluded, under Chevron 
Step Zero, that the IRS did not have the authority to 
interpret Section 36B. The Court even recognized in its 
analysis that the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health 
insurance policy of this sort.”248 But instead, the Court 
refrained from engaging in a Chevron analysis, finding that 
the major questions doctrine rendered Chevron inapplicable. 
The argument can be made that the Court is now 
substituting one doctrine (the major questions doctrine) for 
another (traditional nondelegation doctrine) to deal with 
what it believes are excessive delegations by Congress. In 
doing so, the Court is increasing its own interpretive 
authority at the cost of agency deference. This is especially 
true when the Court could have restricted its analysis within 
the existing Chevron framework, but chose not to. The major 
questions doctrine acts more as a facade for the Court’s 
separation of power effort to diminish administrative power. 
This new approach centers around whether the Court 
believes agency deference should exist as it currently does, 
and can result in judicial decisions that are arbitrarily based 
on the Court’s own policy judgments.249 
CONCLUSION 
One could take the view of the nondelegation argument 
that Chevron violates the separation of powers as the 
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Framers intended, because it allows Congress to 
unconstitutionally delegate too much of its power to 
executive agencies. Or, one could take the view of the 
intelligible principle argument set out in Mistretta that “our 
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding 
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under 
broad general directives.”250 Both views invoke a vision of the 
Constitution. No matter which view one agrees with, 
however, statutory ambiguity is unavoidable,251 and a 
decision must be made as to what entity resolves that 
ambiguity. 
Both Justice Gorsuch and advocates of the major 
questions doctrine believe that the Court should be the entity 
to resolve the ambiguity—at the very least in cases that 
present significant questions. But in setting out the 
constitutional critique of Chevron, both Justice Gorsuch and 
the major questions doctrine, as a manifestation of the same 
criticism, offer a remedy that does not solve the problem of 
which their critique complains. It appears that the Court is 
now substituting the major questions doctrine for the 
traditional nondelegation doctrine to deal with what it 
believes are unconstitutional delegations by Congress. But 
the delegation is not being restored to the legislature. The 
result is a diminution of agency deference and an 
enhancement of the Court’s interpretive role. This 
development, coupled with the fact that a legitimate dispute 
in the constitutional interpretation of Chevron exists, 
demonstrates that what really underlies the arguments over 
Chevron’s existence are policy disagreements over the proper 
role of the current administrative state. 
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